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Abstract:  After considering the side road of critical legal studies, I shall try to indicate the major signposts to a 
more complete jurisprudence. These signposts take the form of questions or anomalies in our present 
understanding of law. I will conclude that only by following these signposts, by exploring these questions and 
anomalies, will we begin to uncover the nature of law and justice. 
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 [pg971]** Jurisprudence is the rigorous study of the nature of law. That is how I would 
like to define the term. I am not importing anything mystical or naturalistic into the definition 
by using the term "nature"; rather, I use it in the same sense that a pure mathematician is said to 
be investigating the nature of arithmetic by attempting to prove or disprove the theorem that the 
number of paired primes continues indefinitely. In fact, I would like to draw particular attention 
to the analogy of law to mathematics: both are artificial constructs of the human mind, neither 
exists in nature, and yet both are sufficiently complex that we are still exploring and 
discovering new facts about them.  
 
 Investigating the nature of law is not the same as deciding what the laws should be. A 
legislator writes on a fairly clean slate; the motives and political considerations that fuel the 
legislative machine and result in an output called statutes are unbounded by any a priori theory. 
To the extent that followers of Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") urge us to reshape existing law in 
accordance with their economic or political desires, I find their prescriptions to be of legislative, 
not jurisprudential interest.FN1 
 
 But CLS purports to offer us, in addition to its political vision, a jurisprudence. Its 
insights are important for at least the reason that it takes the rhetoric of law seriously. Yet I feel 
that CLS, for reasons I shall try to indicate, is not the main road for jurisprudence in the years 
ahead, although it is an important side road. After considering this side road, I shall try to 
indicate the major signposts to a more complete jurisprudence. These signposts take the form of 
questions or anomalies in our present understanding of law. I will conclude that [pg972] only 
by following these signposts, by exploring these questions and anomalies, will we begin to 




 Roberto Unger has accused traditional legal philosophers of objectivism and formalism. 
FN2 I would like to accept his charge and in turn accuse him of doctrinalism. To explain my 
response to Professor Unger, please indulge me in a bit of personal intellectual history. 
 
 When I started teaching law, I was full of self-confidence. Soon, though, I realized that 
the students considered me an aberration from the prevailing instructional mode. Most of my 
colleagues, with a few exceptions, apparently thought of law quite differently than I conceived 
of it. When students came to my class, they assumed, understandably, that as a young professor 




 After long discussions with students, and after visiting some of my colleagues' classes, I 
discovered the prevailing pattern of legal instruction. My colleagues would start with a case; 
they would lead the class in discussing the issues in the case; and then, finally, extract a rule 
from the case. This rule would be deemed the decisional rule of law, which the students 
invariably wrote in their notebooks even if they hadn't taken any other notes. Then the professor 
would go on to the next case, and follow the same pattern. The second case would yield a rule 
that, when added to the rule in the first case, began flesh out the particular area of law. Aha! I 
concluded, a case is an illustrated rule.  
 
 I saw how convenient it was for law-school teachers and students to regard a case as an 
illustrated rule. It makes the rule fun and easy to learn, because everyone enjoys and remembers 
the story of the case. And for the harried student (who in her second or third year, might be 
holding down a part-time job in a law firm) it makes class quite dispensable. She can get her 
rules straight without going to class simply by reading one of the ubiquitous outlines or 
nutshells. Poring over Gilbert's outline, to be sure, isn't as much fun, because it isn't illustrated, 
but it's surely more time-efficient. 
 
 When students came to my class expecting to study cases as illustrated rules, they were 
of course upset by my approach because I challenged the rule-regime presented in their other 
classes. I used cases to throw into great doubt any rule, save perhaps a rule as complex as the 
[pg973] case itself. In short, for me then and nowFN3 a case does not illustrate a rule, whereas 
a rule might illustrate a case if the rule were stated in enough detail as almost to recapture the 
facts of the case in the statement.  
 
 I am an anti-reductionist. I believe that any attempt to state the rule of a case invariably 
distorts the case, and that the shorter the statement of the rule the more distortion creeps in. I 
hold to this position because I believe it is an accurate description of what judges do. By and 
large, judges decide cases and not rules; judges hear fact situations and assign outcomes to 
them. Along with the Legal Realists, then, I think that rules are rationalizations of the results 
judges reach. But unlike the Legal Realists, I am not disappointed that rules don't decide cases 
because I believe that a rule is an imperfect mechanism to capture the variance of the facts and 
therefore is largely incapable of deciding cases.  
 
 In contrast to the widely accepted case method and my own antirule approach, a 
doctrinalist is one who says that a number of cases illustrates a number of rules. The 
methodology of teaching law as doctrine was practiced long before the advent of the case 
method and now seems to be coming back into favor. CLS teaches doctrine with a vengeance; it 
is extremely reductionist.  
 
 CLS was materially helped along its reductionist path by Ronald Dworkin. The paucity 
of citation to Dworkin in the work of CLS theorists is, I'm afraid, in inverse proportion to the 
influence Dworkin has had on the CLS movement. After all, Dworkin taught us that principles, 
as well as rules, can be found in cases;FN4 more than that, whole political theories can be 
found in the legal materials.FN5 In this respect, Dworkin's doctrinalism paved the way for CLS. 
Yet CLS has perhaps slighted Dworkin for political reasons—the conservatism of his doctrine. 
The principles, rules, and policies that Dworkin extracts from legal materials reflect existing 
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institutional arrangements—rather naturally, since law in general reflects existing institutions. 
In contrast, the CLS writers are radical and visionary; for them legal doctrine encompasses 
social realities other than presently existing social relations. CLS' view does not equate law 
with the status quo. Inevitably, then, a normative element enters into the CLS account of 
[pg974]  doctrine.FN6 If, for followers of Dworkin, cases merely illustrate doctrine, for CLS, 
certain cases illustrate the right doctrine, and others, which reflect incorrect or incoherent 
doctrine, should be overruled.FN7  
 
 Another fundamental similarity between some CLS members and Dworkin is the way in 
which they treat legislation and adjudication as interchangeable. When Dworkin argues that 
legal materials are the source of rules, principles, policies, or theories, he includes both statutes 
and cases within the definition of legal materials. CLS similarly elides the distinction between 
cases and statutes; indeed, Professor Unger says that the formalist theory (which he rejects) 
"can be restated as the belief that lawmaking and law application differ fundamentally."FN8 
Both Dworkin and CLS—though Dworkin rather uneasily—see cases and statutes as 
jurisprudential equivalents because they believe that judges really legislate (even though the 
judicial mandate is confined to interstitial legislation). 
 
 The intellectual source for both CLS and Dworkin is positivism, which theorizes that a 
statute contains a double communication to the judge: apply the statute to cases that fall within 
its core meaning, and legislate in the penumbra.FN9 If this is indeed what judges do, then 
theories predicated on judicial discretion and appeals made to a normative vision of society will 
prove the most effective means of influencing judges' decisions. CLS adherents will 
presumably be effective in addressing judges whom they think are empowered to depart from 
existing law by espousing normative doctrine. 
 
 I plead guilty to formalism; I naively believe that lawmaking and law application differ 
fundamentally. And, as I've previously said, I am not a doctrinalist; I don't believe that cases are 
mere illustrations [pg975] of rules. Let me now try to expand upon and defend my position on 
these two matters, beginning with my position that doctrinalism is an unwarranted form of 
reductionism. 
 
B. The Reductionist Fallacy 
 
 The law consists of thousands and thousands of cases, each a microcosmic drama for the 
participants, each involving opposing attorneys utilizing their intelligence to convince an 
intelligent judge. The judge attempts to mediate the parties' dispute with an eye toward avoiding 
other potential disputes through a good decision in the present case. A decisional pattern 
emerges informed by extensive legal brainpower, sharpened in adversarial confrontation, 
refined by considerable expense of time and money. 
 
 These cases stand for the resolution of innumerable disputes that arise in society. These 
disputes have been mediated; interpersonal relations have been settled without resort to 
physical violence. The cases are a great repository of learning, a corpus that has grown by 





 Doctrinalists try to summarize this vast repository of learning with a simple verbal 
formulation or two. Duncan Kennedy, in an early article, summarized millions of cases in all 
areas of law within two propositions: altruism and self-interest.FN10 In a more restricted area 
of law, summarizing perhaps only hundreds of thousands of cases, Professor Unger found two 
governing rules: freedom to contract and community.FN11 At the risk being somewhat unkind, 
these approaches strike me as akin to explaining to an evolutionary biologist, who is studying 
atavism in polydactyl horses, that the whole subject becomes quite comprehensible when one 
realizes that throughout biology there are two overarching principles: the animal and the 
vegetable.  
 
 Perhaps what is wrong with the principles of Professors Kennedy and Unger is that they 
are posed as paired opposites. Perhaps what is needed is reductionism that is not quite so 
severe. A more recent article by Professor Kennedy thus is offered.FN12 There, Professor 
Kennedy finds three principles in tort and contract law (although we are not clearly told 
whether these are to be added to his previous principles [pg976] of altruism and self-interest or 
whether they supersede them). The three principles are: efficiency, redistribution, and 
paternalism. Because Professor Kennedy, like other CLS theorists, views judges as mini-
legislators, he calls these principles "motives." Whether or not they are "motives," I take 
Professor Kennedy's thesis at its strongest, namely, that these three somethings greatly 
illuminate the results reached in hundreds of thousands of cases. 
 
 But now, having moved from paired opposites to three unrelated principles, we have 
moved from an exhaustive list to one that may have gaps. At least altruism and self-interest 
exhaust the universe; but there may be other motives besides efficiency, redistribution, and 
paternalism. What are they? How do the three motives relate to each other? How do we know 
admixtures of two or more of them when we see them? What percentages show up in such 
admixtures? If I say that a judge decided a certain case one-tenth for efficiency motives, four-
tenths for redistribution, and half for paternalism, have I "explained" the case or indulged in a 
whimsy? 
 
 A good cautionary tale against this type of reductionism can be found in a consideration 
of the development of theories of motivational psychologists during the early part of this 
century. Some psychologists of motivation believed that human behavior could be predicted 
and understood on the basis of simply expressed animating motives. For example, at first it was 
thought that love and hate in various combinations might account for all human actions. But, 
then, although love and hate exhausted the universe, it seemed that some actions were 
inadequately explained by either or both of them, but well illuminated by greed or envy. So the 
psychologists expanded the list. But why stop at four? A person's behavior might only be dimly 
understood by reference to any or all of these four traits, but be far better understood by the 
term ambition. So they added ambition to the list. In 1938, in the apotheosis of this movement, 
H.A. Murray, a professor of psychology at Harvard, set forth a list of about 100 basic 
motivations.FN13 After the applause settled down, it was realized that the more we had, the 
less we knew. And since it had earlier been realized that the less we had the less we knew (for 
that is why new items were continually added to the list), the general consensus formed that the 




 There is, however, a more radical argument against reductionism. To return to 
Kennedy's discussion of contract and tort law, how do we know when paternalism, for instance, 
is manifested? Suppose a [pg977] defendant in a contract action pleads as an excuse that he 
made a mistake based on ignorance of the market. Is it paternalistic to decide for the defendant 
(assuming he was sincerely ignorant)? Or is it paternalistic to decide against the defendant, thus 
teaching him a "lesson" that will serve him in good stead along the rocky of commercial life?  
 
 The difficulty in maintaining a legal distinction between two qualities such as 
individualism and altruism, or contract and community, is reminiscent of a central problem in 
modem physics. At the turn of the century there were two competing theories to describe 
photons of light: particle theory and wave theory. The wave theory was supported by optical 
experiments where interference fringes were observed. The particle theory was supported by 
black-body radiation experiments and the photoelectric effect. So, what were photons--waves or 
particles?  
 
 The great quantum mechanical discoveries of the late 1920's demonstrated that photons 
were both particle and wave and neither particle nor wave. Later, this discovery was found to 
apply not just to photons; it applied to every elementary entity making up the universe: 
positrons, protons, neutrons, pi-mesons, hadrons, quarks, etc. Since in the macroscopic world of 
our daily perceptions we cannot conceive of any such entity—both and neither particle/wave—
we reluctantly conclude that the elementary entities that make up our universe are indescribable 
and unimaginable. In short, no verbal or visualizable theory can describe the basic building-
blocks of our universe. (Some people loosely say that these elementary entities can be 
described mathematically, but in fact the mathematics only correlates with their behavior and 
doesn't "describe" it. We can predict—in the aggregate—how quantum entities behave, but we 
do not "understand" their behavior, since we have no analogues in our experience to that 
behavior.) 
 
 Based on this analogy to physics, I propose the possibility that some legal decisions 
simply cannot be described by any rule—whether by resort to 2 or 100 motives. An example 
might be Professor Unger's principle of freedom of contract and his counterprinciple of 
communitarianism. In the vast majority of contract cases the two might be co-present, as wave 
and particle are in quantum mechanics. But since, according to Professor Unger, they contradict 
each other, we cannot intelligibly comprehend what it means to say that they are co-present. 
We're left with an amazing result. In physics we know that the behavior of elementary entities 
is completely described by an unknowable congruence of wave and particle, and that no other 
[pg978] theory is necessary. Similarly, Professor Unger's principle and counterprinciple may 
completely describe a large number of contract cases in the sense that no other theories are 
necessary, but still leave totally inexplicable any given case on the basis of any combination of 
those theories. 
 
 There may already exist large numbers of cases for which we have been unable to 
fashion any rules or doctrine. Indeed, one such area turns up in Professor Unger's examination 
of doctrine in contracts. In discussing the application of the theory of economic duress to 
voidable and nonvoidable contracts, he finds that a "revised duress" doctrine with a roving 
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commission to void contracts between parties of disparate bargaining power could run rampant 
and destroy the validity of decentralized decisionmaking through contract. Then he writes:  
 
The cost of preventing the revised duress doctrine from running wild and from 
correcting almost everything is to draw unstable, unjustified, and unjustifiable lines 
between the contracts that are voidable and those that are not. In the event, the law 
draws these lines by a strategy of studied indefinition, though it might just as  
well have done so—as it so often does elsewhere—through precise but makeshift 
distinctions.FN14 
 
What we have in this passage is the critique of a doctrinalist who is unable to discern his own 
doctrine (remember, he formulated the principles and counterprinciples) in the cases he is 
examining. Apparently the alternative does not occur to Professor Unger: there may be no 
doctrine, including his own, that describes these cases. Instead, he draws the conclusion that if 
the cases are correctly decided, then it is the market economy which gave rise to those cases 
that is in need of correction. In short, the inability to find doctrinal clarity in a group of cases 
means that the institution that the cases reflect (here, the market economy) must be overturned 
and replaced by something better (i.e., something that will yield doctrinally pure decisional 
results). 
 
 The suspicion that the use of paired opposites may lead to a doctrine that is vacuous has 
not escaped the CLS theorists. Professor Kennedy has acknowledged that the paired opposites 
of individualism and altruism point to a kind of fundamental human ambivalence: that humans 
have a contradictory nature and possess both qualities simultaneously.FN15 Perhaps it could be 
useful to him to consult the theory of [pg979] complementarity, developed by Niels Bohr and 
the  "Copenhagen School" to describe the indeterminacy of the wave-particle theory of 
quantum electrodynamics. Under complementarity, when theories come to us in mutually 
exhaustive opposites, each forms the boundary of the other. In this light I've suggested 
elsewhere that pure altruism in society is impossible—that altruism is ultimately bounded by 
self interest.FN16 But I am unsure that there is much explanatory power in the theory of 
complementarity because of its lack of specificity, and I am even less able to find anything 
concrete in Professor Kennedy's notion of fundamental human ambivalence. It may "explain" 
what "people" are in large terms, but it can hardly explain any individual case. Another way of 
putting this is to imagine a judge who is rigorously bound to apply Professor Kennedy's paired 
opposites of altruism and individualism. Despite this guaranteed supremacy of Professor 
Kennedy's preferred doctrine, the judge nevertheless could consistently decide the case either 
way.  
 
 So far I have presented two attacks on doctrinal reductionism. First, implicit in the 
charge of reductionism is the standard philosophical objection that descriptive power is lost as 
one proceeds to more generalized levels of verbal summation. Second, reduction may not even 
be possible in some cases. (I might go further and say that, in a real sense, reductionism is 
impossible in all cases, but I save that for a later day.) 
 
 Yet I do not want to rule out the possibility that rules or principles can elucidate 
decisional results. Maybe sometimes they do. Even though I have criticized Professors Unger 
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and Kennedy, I confess to anticipating with eagerness their next writings. I await their 
discovery of new and as yet unimagined principles that will truly reveal vast areas of legal 
decisionmaking. Doctrine of that power would be as satisfying to me as a "rule of law" is to the 
beginning law student who has come to law school to memorize lots of laws. 
  
 Nevertheless, a reader may ask, what is my alternative to doctrinalism? This is the 
question I find so hard to deal with when asked by law students, who put it a different way: "If 
the case doesn't stand for a rule, how can we understand the case?" 
 
 I submit that we don't need doctrine to understand the law. A [pg980] case doesn't live 
by rules alone. Rather, we can intelligibly understand the cases themselves without rules; in a 
peculiar sense, the medium is the message. B swings an axe at A; A, instead of fighting back, 
goes to court and sues B for injury and harm. The court gives a judgment to A. I propose that 
we don't need to have the rule-word "assault" to understand this case. Suppose we have never 
heard of the word "assault"—or, more realistically perhaps, suppose a beginning law student 
always wondered what it was but never knew. To that student, the term "assault" is defined by 
the axe case; hence it can hardly explain the case. We don't even need the word "assault" to 
communicate. In the next case, we simply refer to the previous "axe" case, or to the case of A v. 
B, or however we want to designate the first case. We have a picture in our minds of the axe 
case. We know what the judicial result was. That image communicates something to us. It is a 
message that we are capable of processing and storing in our minds. We simply move on to 
considering whether the next case ought to be judged consistently with the first one, and thus 
we are engaged in using and applying the law. 
 
 But knowing the rule can botch up our judgment on the second case. Suppose, for 
example, the second case involves D hitting C. If some doctrinalist has labeled this second case 
as one of "battery," a beginning law student might well conclude that the result in the first case 
has nothing to do with the result in the second case, because "assault" is clearly not the same as 
"battery." Yet if we leave out the rule-words, I suspect that most people, just looking at the 
facts, would conclude that a decision for A in the first case compels a decision for C in the 
second case. Why? Well, it has something to do with our knowledge of the physical world, of 
human nature, of logic and consistency, of the relations between people, of the need for courts 
to prevent violence—all things which are implicit in the "axe" case and which we readily 
analogize to the C v. D case.  
 
 I suspect, as well, that the economic-duress cases cited by Professor Unger, a close 
enough examination of the facts would provide some patterned decisional regularities. Surely if 
you, as a practitioner, handle a contracts-duress case, you will first read the cases in the area 
and try to show the court that your client should win based on the results of the most analogous 
leading cases. Your argument will be largely one of comparing the facts of your case to those 
cases—especially so if Professor Unger is right that the cases resist doctrinal line-drawing. But 
surely, argument from facts is not a failure of communication. If the cases don't lend themselves 
to doctrine, so much the worse for doctrine.  
 
 [pg981] I have elsewhere proposed a system of adjudication that omits all doctrine, 
rules, principles, and policies.FN17 It is a computer program made up of facts and decisional 
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results in a given jurisdiction, capable of deciding every new case that arises. Whether or not it 
will ever be tried or adopted, I am confident that it greatly reduces if not eliminates uncertainty 
in the law, leads to results that are completely predictable, yields exact egalitarian justice, and 
saves a tremendous amount of litigation expense (including the need for judges). But just on a 
heuristic basis, the program suggests that legal decisionmaking is possible absent all the rules 
that laymen think of as "the law."  
 
 Nevertheless I would not propose that we omit rules from our study of law. If in class I 
can attack the proposition that a case is an illustrated rule, and at least show that cases and rules 
have a symbiotic relationship, I will be satisfied. Indeed, "facts" do not come to us in 
unadulterated form, because we see the world through our theories of it. A judge, in listening to 
the "facts" of a case, will view the facts through the spectacles of the law—law that includes 
rules as well as facts of prior cases. Thus, the facts recounted in a judicial opinion may be 
shaped in part by the legal theories (doctrine, rules, principles, policies) in the judge's mind. 
Maybe rules and facts stand in the same relation to each other as waves and particles. Or maybe 
they continually refine and correct each other. Maybe they are complementary to each other. In 
any event, we have a great deal yet to learn about these matters. The CLS writings stimulate us 
in this learning endeavor, but as I have tried to show, they do not aim directly at a solution. 
 
C. The Formalist Distinction 
 
 I think legislation and adjudication are fundamentally different for reasons that are so 
obvious that I marvel at CLS' success in casting doubt upon them. A legislator writes on a clean 
slate. Under positivism, it is true, a judge also writes on a clean slate, although the slate is very 
tiny. But I think positivism is incorrect, and that judges do not write on tiny slates because they 
are called upon to tell the parties what the law was at the time the transaction took place. The 
parties acted under a legal regime and now, in court, they dispute what that legal regime was. 
They expect the judge, as law finder, to tell them. They would yell and scream if the judge 
wrote new law and then applied it retroactively to them. 
 
 I have elsewhere spelled out various reasons in support of the proposition that judges 
find, and do not make, law,FN18 and there is no [pg982] point here in repeating those 
arguments. What I can add here is that those arguments are compatible with Legal Realism (and 
with CLS to the extent it is grounded in Legal Realism). A Legal Realist says that all kinds of 
things influence judges:  the state of their digestion, their political affiliation, their economic 
class, whether they have been bribed by one of the parties, what policies they like, and so forth. 
But to this list it is permissible for me to add another motive: to do justice to the parties 
according to law. This certainly is a possible motive, and while it may not be as powerful as 
some other motive (e.g., the bribeFN19), it is one that is open to influence by rational 
adversarial argument. We can never know what ultimately influences a judge to make a given 
decision, but three years of law school education are probably worth the time and expense if 
judges are somewhat open to persuasion based on legal argument. In short, if you concede to 
me that there is one possible motive among others—doing justice according to the law—then a 
huge hole is opened in Realist theory, and through that hole we can drive a truck bearing the 




 These days, law is, to be sure, largely found in statutes. The question of what is rational 
legislation, and related questions of the hierarchy of statutes and their desuetude, are properly 
the domain of jurisprudence broadly conceived. But since statutes use courts as their conduit for 
application to real people and real transactions, I think that the major advances in the study of 
the nature of law will come in the realm of adjudication. Perhaps to the extent I feel this way I 
am not as attuned as I should be to advances made by CLS which result from their mixing 
legislation and adjudication. I see jurisprudence from a different slant, and it may be a distorted 




 We live in an exciting time of jurisprudential upheaval, paradigm shifts, wholesale 
reconceptualizations. The philosophic distance travelled since I was a law student in the late 
1950's may best be indicated by the fact that, among editors of the Harvard Law Review at that 
time, it was almost universally considered a publication blunder to have published the Hart-
Fuller debate in a now classic issue of that Review. I recall editors buttressing their views with 
letters from practitioners who threatened to terminate their subscriptions if the Review [pg983]  
continued to waste its pages on jurisprudential nonsense instead of on articles designed to aid 
practitioner research on hot subjects of large law firm litigation. 
 
 Fortunately, we have not only become more aware of the need to investigate the law 
itself (as opposed to this or that subject within the law), but even practitioners are beginning to 
feel the force of jurisprudential argument as a powerful weapon of persuasion in the courtroom. 
Scholarly interest in metalaw has combined with financial interest in the real world of litigation 
to produce a powerful and maybe sustaining interest in legal philosophy. 
  
 When the investigative intellect thus turns to the nature of a subject matter at a time of 
wholesale reconceptualization, a critical area of inquiry concerns the attempt to explain 
anomalies. An anomaly does not quite fit received theory, and tends to be brushed off as a mere 
curiosity or a measurement error. For example, physicists at the turn of the twentieth century 
were aware of an unexplained discrepancy in the measurement of the perihelion of the planet 
Mercury. This deviation in motion from the ellipse called for in Newton's gravitation theory 
was not a burning issue for physicists; they simply lived with it and turned their attention to 
other things. But in 1916, Einstein announced a new theory—general relativity—one of whose 
consequences was to predict the observed deviation of Mercury's orbit. General relativity called 
for the reconceptualization of gravity and accelerated motion, a theory so revolutionary that 
most physicists would have ignored it except for its ability to explain a few anomalies. What 
was an anomaly under Newton's theory became a success under Einstein's new view of the 
matter.  
 
 Following are some anomalies in the law which I believe will act as signposts toward a 
new understanding of its nature: 
 
 1. How do we deal with prospective overruling? Is it fair to both sides of a litigation? 
The concept seems to split the difference between whether judges make or find law, and thus 
points to a basic problem in our understanding of adjudication. George Fletcher has recently 
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called this problem an anomaly,FN20 but his interesting observations about it fall short, in my 
opinion, of resolving the question, partly because the anomaly resounds so deeply in our 
fundamental understanding of law and justice.  
 
 2. Perhaps the entire question of whether judges make or find law is itself anomalous, 
pointing to a quantum-type resolution (judges both make and find law at the same time). We 
know that parties [pg984] expect judges to find the law, but what happens when judges fail to 
find old law in sufficient detail to decide the case? Does the pressure to find law put a 
significant restraint on the way the judge can make law? In the classroom, we answer this 
question in just about every case we study. But we are not systematic about our answers, which 
do not necessarily carry over into the next class on a different subject matter. More 
investigative rigor is needed to throw light on the nature of adjudication opened by these 
questions. 
 
 3.  How do we explain the anomalies in professional ethics that arise when a lawyer is 
obliged to act against the interest of the client? Consider the problem of confidentiality when an 
attorney obtains knowledge that her client is about to inflict grave bodily harm illegally upon an 
innocent third person.FN21 What is it about the nature of law that calls for attorneys to 
represent clients and at the same time be officers of the court? Is it a variant on the find-make 
law anomaly?  
 
 4. How is reasoning by analogy bounded? We reason by analogy all the time, but how 
do we know when one set of facts is not analogous to another? Surely any case has some 
similarities as well as some differences with respect to any other case. Is an assault case similar 
to or different from a battery case? Is a contract case a form of tort case? Again, we explore 
these matters all the time in the classroom, but not systematically.  
 
 5. Is it tautological to distinguish one case from another because the rule that governs it 
is different? How do we know whether the rules are different, or whether they are contradictory 
versions of the same rule (in which event the two case results are in conflict)?  
 
 6. How does the common law get started? Lord Mansfield extracted from mercantile 
customs a "law merchant," a new set of legal rules based on customary practice. But when, and 
how, does customary practice become legally binding? Positivism has never explained it, 
except by the nontheory called judicial discretion. Yet it happens, and continues to happen. It is 
an anomaly in positivist theory, and although it is quite compatible with natural-law theory, the 
latter so far has not explained the when and the how.  
 
 7.  How do justice and morality get into the law? Are they simply accidental 
parallelisms? We know this much: an attorney who argues to a judge that her case is morally 
right but legally wrong almost invariably loses. Professionalism in advocacy comes in when the 
attorney can show that the morally correct result is confirmed by the law if the law is looked at 
in a certain way. If the attorney can make [pg985] this demonstration, she is more likely to win 
because she has both morality and law on her side. Hence, morality and justice are not 
irrelevant to adjudication. But the way that they are, come to be, or ought to be relevant is still a 
vast unexplored question. "Answers" may be found in litigation, or in students writing articles, 
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or in the classroom, but so far there has been no satisfying attempt to pull these answers 
together into a coherent theory.  
 
 8.  How are law and justice related? Do we get justice when we act according to the 
law? Or is justice something apart from the law by which we can measure the amount of justice 
in the law? Both the CLS and economic analysis of law take the latter view. Yet wouldn't they 
concede that it would be unjust to treat two individuals differently under any given law? If so, 
don't we need law to have justice?  
 
 9.  Does law contain the seeds of its own destruction, in the sense that legal rules 
unravel over time and become increasingly amorphous and incapable of resolving issues? 
Partly to be provocative, I advanced such a thesis in a recent article, which so far has provoked 
no response.FN22 If I am right (and at the least I can attribute to the lack of response the chance 
that I am not clearly wrong), the anomalous possibility opens up that legal rules wear out and 
need refurbishing from time to time.  
 
 10.  To my mind, the greatest anomaly of all in the study of law is the possibility that 
Hume was wrong when he insisted on a dichotomy between is and ought. The law that is may 
turn out to be a sort of quantum fusion between the law that is and the law that ought to be. It is 
possible that our Western, scientific, denotative language is itself responsible for separating the 
is from the ought, and that we are prisoners of a mistaken theory as a result of the very words 
which we use. If existing law is in fact—apart from our linguistic analysis of it—a fusion of the 
is and the ought, perhaps that possibility will go a long way toward resolving the previous 
anomalies I mentioned, including the one that judges both make and find law. The make-find 
problem, indeed, may be a variant of the is-ought problem. The question of how justice is 
related to law—which on its face ought to be the question of legal education—may also be a 
variant on the is-ought problem.  
 
 All the preceding anomalies come up in the classroom and in legal practice. They are 
resolved on a piecemeal basis. Often they are ignored. Often there is a mental block against 
them because of their inherent difficulty. More usually, they are papered over with [pg986] 
ambiguous words that purport to resolve them. If Professor Unger's "objectivism" and 
"formalism" refer to a possible theory that may someday explain those anomalies, I would 
argue that instead of having too much objectivism and formalism, we do not have enough. But I 
think we are heading there, and Professor Unger's attack on this approach may have the 
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FN1 Of course, a similar criticism can also be made of those who engage in an economic 
analysis of the law. Some writers making an economic analysis have also furnished us with 
important jurisprudential insights, such as the categorization of entitlements in Calabresi & 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).  
 
FN2 Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 563-76 (1983). 
 
FN3 At first, my students resolved their dilemma by concluding that I was out of step with the 
rest of the faculty and a proper object of resistance. With the passage of time, I've become a 
better salesman for my approach so that students aren't quite as thrown by it; but I still confess 
to having some trouble getting the message across. 
 
FN4 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 14-45 (1977).  
 
FN5 Id. at 81-130. 
 
FN6 In Unger's words: [CLS attempts] to cross the boundaries that separate doctrine from 
empirical social theory and from argument over the proper organization of society.... [CLS] 
method is to show, as a matter of truth about history and society, that [abstract ideals, such as 
freedom of contract or political equality] can receive—and almost invariably have received—
alternative institutional embodiments, each of which gives a different cast to their guiding 
intentions.  Unger, supra note 2, at 577-78.  
 
FN7 Unger argues that the class of legitimate doctrinal activities must be enlarged. [O]nly such 
an expansion could generate a conceptual practice that maintains the minimal characteristics of 
doctrine—the willingness to take the extant authoritative materials as starting points and the 
claim to normative authority—while avoiding the arbitrary juxtaposition of easy analogy and 
truncated theorizing that characterizes the most ambitious and coherent examples of legal 
analysis today. Unger, supra note 2, at 577. 
 
FN8 Unger, supra note 2, at 563-76. 
 
FN9 For an analysis, see A. D'Amato, Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis  
of the Law 132-39 (1984).  
 
FN10 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 
(1976).  
 
FN11 Unger, supra note 2, at 618-25.  
 
FN12 Kennedy, Distributive and Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to 




FN13 H. A. Murray, Explorations in Personality (1938).  
 
FN14 Unger, supra note 2, at 629.  
 
FN15  Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1685. While Kennedy initially identifies altruism and 
individualism as modes of rhetoric, he also locates these polarities at a “deeper level.” "[W]e 
are divided, among ourselves and also within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of 
humanity and society...." Id. Professor Kennedy's writing suggests, however, that people have 
the power to isolate and choose one or the other of the contradictory tendencies. But if he is 
talking about what people have the power to do, as opposed to what they actually do, his 
doctrine is no longer descriptive or jurisprudential, but rather becomes prescriptive and 
legislative.  
 
FN16 A. D'Amato, supra note 9, at 295 n.30.  
 
FN17 A. D'Amato, supra note 9, at 155-79. 
 
FN18 Id. at 56-92.  
 
FN19 Bribes are harder to deal with than bias. I've suggested that rotation and anonymity of 
judges is an important structural element in reducing the possibility of bribery. See A. D'Amato, 
supra note 9, at 34-45.  
 
FN20 Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1263, 1272-79 (1985).  
 
FN21 See D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 St. Louis U.L.J. 761, 777-78 
(1983). 
 
FN22 D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Calif. L. Rev. (1983). 
 
